Relations between states Essay Example for Free

Relations between states EssayWinston Churchill famously lamented, It may be that we sh every(prenominal) by a process of sublime irony bring on reached a stage in this fabrication where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation. In the viewing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a new thermo atomic age was ushered in with mushroom clouds and unimaginable destruction. Suddenly, humankind had invented a artillery unit powerful enoughif used in sufficient quantityto destroy the Earths capacitance to sustain human life. For the world, the menace of thermo atomic winter was terrifying. To social scientists, it was equally frightening, barely also presented a new paradigm of inter communityal relations. Technology has evolved through give away history, but neer before had an advancement in machines fundamentally shifted anything more than battlefield tactics. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, brought a tremendous shift in the relatio ns between states.Suddenly, the stakes of fight were different suddenly, war between two states had implications for the planet that wars had never produced before. John Mueller, in his article The Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons, disputes the idea that nuclear weapons actually fundamentally changed the landscape painting of international relations. Instead, Mueller argues, the horrors of World warfares I and II already escalated the stakes of warfare to a tipping point level, where the cost were so high that warfare was naturally monishred between stable, developed states.Specifically, Mueller cites the memory of World contend II, baron contentment with the postwar precondition quo, Soviet ideology, and a fear of escalation as the primary four reasons that nuclear weapons did not fundamentally change the nature of war deterrence. Muellers line of reasoning, while logically sound, has not held up to the tests of empiricism. Muellers first argumentthat nuclear deterrence had litt le impact because all nations were already so horrified by the devastation wrought by World War II that they would never twin its destructionis weak.Certainly, World War II is the most tragic and destructive event of the twentieth snow and probably is unrivalled in human history for its breadth of brutality and human loss of life. Yet, as Mueller admits, World War I was enough to convince the world of the maxim never again, only to have a similar conflict erupt twenty years after the guns of World War I were silenced. On top of the similarity between World War I and World War II, the stimulate of World War II was not free from conflict.For the United States, even, the Korean conflict broke out less than a decade after World War II and was quickly followed by Vietnam. both conflicts brought about staggering casualties. Clearly, World War II was worse, but it was not enough of a disablement to stop many wars in its aftermath. In other words, Muellers argument that nuclear deterren ce did not fundamentally shift the landscape because World War IIs horrors took care of doing so, does not place upright up to the test of facts conflicts erupted regardless. More importantly, however, nuclear war would be substantially different than World War II.World War II was immensely devastating because it was fought by enormous armies of many different countries for several(prenominal) years. Nuclear war could not be more different it could be carried out with little more than a small air force, the right bombs, and could last days. Once the Soviet Union and the United States acquired nuclear weapons, it was a different ballgame. Entire cities could be wiped off the map in a second. For policymakers, that changed the incentive structures. pi one and only(a)er a war with the Soviet Union prior to the nuclear age would have enlisted the entire nations resources, citizens, and finances.On the other hand, when there was an asymmetry of powerbetween 1945 and 1949 specificallyth e American government could have eliminated a Soviet city from existence with little more than a single one thousand and a small aircrew. That skewed the playing field heavily in the favor of the United States. But, that changed when the Soviets acquired nuclear capability. Suddenly, both countries faced the same incentives and the same disincentives to go to war each was assured that a nuclear pom-pom by one would prompt a retaliationperhaps a disproportionate onefrom the other.This created a paradoxwithout having to deploy armies or finance massive military campaigns, war was oft impendent it simply took an order from Washington or Moscow. Yet, the stakes were also higher. With nuclear weapons in play, escalation was simultaneously much closer and much less desirable. The fact that conventional conflicts between states raged on in the post-war era but nuclear conflict has never arisen speaks volumes about the unique power of a nuclear deterrent. Thus, Muellers argument about the deterrence of conventional conflict does not hold up to analytical scrutiny given(p) historys contradiction.Moreover, Muellers argument that the superpowers were already unlikely to go to war (with or without nuclear weapons) because they were content with the status quo is equally vacuous. Certainly, the superpowers never engaged directly in combat. But nuclear weapon deterrent possibility posits that nuclear weapons impedes escalation to the highest levels because the costs associated are simply unbearable for all involved parties. In other words, if Mueller is correct that the post-war status quo already acted as a sufficient deterrent, then the superpowers should have been peace-loving throughout the Cold War.Far from it, they instead engaged in many proxy warswars specifically knowing to allow low-level conflict as each vied for further control of the globe, but simultaneously to check over that the conflict would never rage out of control and risk bringing nuclear weap ons to the table. Cold War flare ups between communist and capitalist powers prove Muellers conjecture to be false the post-war status quo was repeatedly altered as the Soviets and Americans each sought to expand their power and gain a strategical advantage over their enemy, without inviting the use of nuclear weapons precisely because of nuclear deterrence.Muellers third argumentthat Soviet ideology was a sufficient deterrent that is often mis-attributed to the myth of nuclear deterrenceis simply a red herring. Mueller makes a strong case, certainly, but it does not address the fundamentals of nuclear deterrence scheme. hardly because the Soviets in particular may have been less likely to engage in a full-out war with another hegemonic power, that does not negate the validity of nuclear deterrence theory.Simply stated, nuclear deterrence theory is an idea that applies to all states, and invoking the Soviet case to disprove the entirety of the rule is a weak attack that falls fl at. Muellers fourth argumentthat a fear of escalation was already in place and did not need nuclear weapons to operateis equally flawed. Fear of escalation is precisely the heart of nuclear deterrence theory nuclear weapons prevent war because provoking a nuclear power is likely to yield awing horrors.Mueller suggests that the threat of war alone is horrific enough to produce a similar deterrent and that as a result, nuclear weapons did little to change deterrence dynamics. But empirical research disagrees. According to Robert Rauchhaus of the University of California, Santa Barbara, When a nuclear asymmetry exists between two states, there is a greater chance of militarized disputes and war. In contrast, when there is symmetry and both states possess nuclear weapons, then the odds of war precipitously drop. Rauchhauss research, which draws upon many decades of empirical research, quantitatively validates the importance of nuclear weapons. Even though, as Rauchhaus points out, nucl ear weapons are not universally positive in their deterrent effects (asymmetrical nuclear capabilities can promote rather than deter war, for example), they inevitably have an impact (and a substantial one at that) on international affairs. This teach flies in the face of Muellers claim that nuclear weapons are simply tangential deterrents ladder parallel to a larger deterrent growing out of the desire to avoid large wars.On all four fronts, Muellers claims are flimsy. His article is nonetheless important because it challenges the premises of deterrent theory and suggests an alternative viewpoint. In the end, however, it seems that nuclear weapons do make a difference conventional wars continue at regular intervals, but no nuclear weapon has been dropped in warfare since the horrors of Nagasaki and Hiroshima jolted the world into a stunned realization that nuclear warfare was simply unacceptable and needed to be avoided at all costs.